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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE MOFFAT COUNTY STATE

)

BANK, a Corporation,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case
No. 9166

-vs.R. J. PINDER,

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF O·F AP·PELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 12, 1956, R. J. Pinder issued his check
number 442 in the amount of $2,500.00 payable to
Bill Arnn.
On all dates relative to this action Bill Arnn, sometimes known as E. S. Arnn, had an account in The Moffat County State Bank. At the time Bill Arnn opened
his account in The Moffat County State Bank he executed
a depositor's agreement which contained the following
provision:

1
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''Items received for deposit or collection are
accepted on the following terms and conditions.
This bank acts only as depositor's collection agent
... items are credited subject to final payment and
to receipt of proceeds of final payment in cash ...
by this bank at its office ... " (R-10)
On October 15, 1956, at Craig, Colorado, Bill Arnn
endorsed the above referred to check for deposit to his
checking account and coincidentally therewith executed
a deposit agreement which deposit agreement contains
the following statement:
''Items received for deposit or collection are
accepted on the following terms and conditions.
This bank acts only as depositor's collecting agent
and assumes no responsibility beyond its exercise
of due care. All items are credited subject to final
payment and to receipt of proceeds of final payment in cash or solvent credits by this bank at its
own office. This bank may forward items to correspondents and shall not be liable for default or
negligence of correspondents selected with due
care nor for losses in transit, and each correspondent shall not be liable except for its own negligence.
Items and their proceeds may be handled by any
Federal Reserve Bank in accordance with applicable Federal Reserve rules and by this bank or any
correspondent in accordance with any common
bank usage, with any practice or procedure that a
Federal Reserve Bank may use or permit another
bank to use or with any other lawful means. This
bank may charge back at any time any item drawn
on this bank which is ascertained to be drawn
against insufficient funds or otherwise not good or
payable. An item received after this bank's regular afternoon closing hour shall be deemed received
the next business day. (R-9 Lines through 17
and R-11)
2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Moffat County State Bank gave Bill Arnn credit
in his checking account for the face amount of the
check. (R-8)
The check was presented to the drawee Bank (Sandy
City Bank), on October 20, 1956, and was dishonored.
(R-8)

The Moffat County State Bank received notice of
dishonor on October 22, 1956, and cancelled its endorsement on the check on October 24, 1956. (R-8)
The Moffat County State Bank received notice of dishonor on October 22, 1956, and cancelled its endorsement
on the check on October 24, 1956. (R-8)
The Moffat County State Bank on and between the
date of receipt of deposit and notice of dishonor paid the
following checks against the credit resulting from the
deposit of the check referred to. (R-10)
Oct. 15 $217.27less credit $27.10 ______ $190.17
Oct.
Oct.
Oct.
Oct.
Oct.
Oct.
Oct.
Oct.
Oct.
Oct.

16---------------------------------------------------16·--------------------------------------------------16---------------------------------------------------18·--------------------------------------------------19·--------------------------------------------------19·--------------------------------------------------19 ----------------------------------·----------------19---------------------------------------------------20---------------------------------------------------20----------------------------------------------------

50.00
50.00
272.56
50.00
200.00
27 4.86
285.14
376.16
267.14
200.00

Total Checks----------·-----------$2,216. 03
3
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The· consideration for. the check above referred to
f~iled and R. J. Pinder notified Sandy City Bank to refuse
payment when the check was presented and said bank
did refuse payment. (R-8)
The Moffat County State Bank did not have knowledge of the failure of consideration until such time as it
was advised that the check had been dishonored and
said bank now holds said check and the same has not been
paid. (R-9)
The Moffat County State Bank is incorporated under
the laws of the State of Colorado with its principal place
of business in Craig, Colorado, and R. J. Pinder is a
resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (R-8)
The instrument has not been protested by plaintiff.
(R-8, 9, and 15)
(For emphasis, the Appellant has italicized portions
of documents and authorities in its brief.)

STATEMENT OF POINTS
The Court erred in granting the plaintiff's and respondent's motion for summary judgment, in that:
I. THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT A HOLDER IN DUE
COURSE AND THEREFORE F AlLURE OF CONSIDERATION IS AN ABSOLUTE DEFENSE TO THE
ACTION.
II. THE LAW OF THE STATE OF UTAH MUST
BE APPLIED IN DETERMINING THE LEGAL
STATUS OF THE PLAINTIFF.
4
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III. THE CHECK WAS NOT PROTESTED AS
REQUIRED BY TITLE 44, CHAPTER 2, SECTION 27,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) AND THEREFORE THE DRAWER IS DISCHARGED.
ARGUMENT
PoiNT I.
I. THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT A ROLDER IN DUE
COURSE AND THEREFORE F AlLURE OF CONSIDERATION IS AN ABSOLUTE DEFENSE TO THE
ACTION.

If the plaintiff is not a holder in due course then,
under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, Title 44,
Chapter 1, Section 59, Utah Code Annotated 1953, the
plaintiff is barred from recovery for it is stipulated that
the consideration for the instrument failed.
"44-1-59. WHEN SuBJECT TO ORIGINAL DEFENsEs. - In the hands of any holder other than a
holder in due course a negotiable instrument is
subject to the same defenses as if it were nonnegotiable ... ''
It is therefore obvious that the plaintiff must establish that he was a holder in due course. A holder in due
course is defined by Title 44, Chapter 1, Section 53, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as follows:
"44-1-53. WHAT CoNSTITUTES A HoLDER IN
DUE CouRsE. - A holder in due course is a holder
who has taken the instrument under the following
conditions :
'' (1) That it is complete and regular upon-its
face.
5
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"(2) That he became the holder of it before
it was overdue and without notice that it
had been previously dishonored, if such
was the fact.
'' ( 3) That he took it in good faith and for
value.
" ( 4) That at the time it was negotiated to
him he had no notice of any infirmity in
the instrument or defect in the title of
the person negotiating it.''
The critical portions of the above statute are the portions that require the holder to take the instrument "in
good faith and for value'' by ''negotiation.'' It is appellant's contention in this case that the plaintiff was not
a holder in due course and not entitled to the privileges
and protections thereof because the plaintiff took the
instrument as agent of the payee and therefore all defenses available against the principal are also available
against the agent.
The relationship between the payee of the check and
the plaintiff bank is controlled by written agreements
which agreements, as set forth in the Statement of Facts,
constitute the bank an agent of the payee for the purpose
of collecting the instrument. These agreements are prepared by the Moffat County State Bank and therefore
must be construed most strictly against said bank. The
wording of the agreements is clear and concise and defines
the bank as agent only.
The law of the State of Utah is clearly set forth in
the case of Western Creamery Co. v. Malia et al., 89 Utah
422, 57 P. (2d) 734, wherein the Court determined that
6
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the bank would be found by its deposit agreement. The
Court's decision in the case of Western Creamery Co. v.
Malia et al., supra, stated as follows:

'' * * * . . . When the deposit slip contains
a provision to the effect that the bank in which the
check is deposited acts merely as the agent for
collection, and not as purchaser thereof, such fact
is uniformly regarded as very material, if not conclusive, evidence of the intention of the parties as
to the passing of title. 11 A.L.R. 1070 ; 42 A.L.R.
502; 68 A. L. R. 735. In the instant case the check
was received by the defendant bank which was
authorized to forward it for collection or payment,
and to receive payment in a draft drawn by the
drawee or other bank, and, except for negligence,
the defendant bank was not liable for the dishonor
of the draft so received in payment, nor for losses
thereon. The foregoing provision clearly indicates
that the defendant bank regarded itself, not as the
owner of the check, but as the mere agent for the
collection of the money notwithstanding plaintiff
was given credit therefor. Plaintiff did not draw
against the check nor receive any payment
thereon. There was no agreement to the effect that
plaintiff had any such a right. The mere fact that
on one occasion plaintiff did draw against a check
deposited to its account at the defendant bank before the check had been collected from the drawee
bank does not require a finding that plaintiff on
the occasion in question had such a right. The finding of the court below to the effect that· the title to
the check in question did not pass to the defendant
bank when it was there deposited should not be
disturbed. ''
The doctrine in Utah is in conformity with the general rule of law as applied in the United States and as
7
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f:fet forth in 7 American Juris prudence states, beginning on page 320 :

Banks, which

"§449. Effect of Giving Credit; Right to
Charge Back Dishonored Paper. - ... That the
title remains in the depositor is especially true if
the credit is entered upon the agreement that it is
subject to payment of the paper and that it may
be charged off in case of the dishonor of the paper.
(... 11 A.L.R. 1050, s. 16 A.L.R. 1084, 42 A.L.R.
495, 68 A.L.R. 729, and 99 A.L.R. 489.) ... The
bank may, as a matter of favor and convenience,
permit checks to be drawn against such paper before. payment, since the depositor, in the event of
nonpayment, is responsible for the sums drawn,
not by reason of his indorsement, the paper not
having ceased to be his property, but for money
paid.''
In this case the intention of the parties is determined
not just by a routine execution of a deposit slip but is
actually controlled by the deposit agreement. It is necessary to determine the intention of the parties at the time
of the negotiation or transfer of the instrument from the
payee to the Moffat County State Bank. This rule is set
forth in 7 American Jurisprudence - Banks § 447 as
follows:
"D. Deposits of Commercial Paper; Title
Thereto; Right to Charge Back Credit Given
''§449. Generally.''The determination of the question of title to
commercial paper transferred to a bank which
credits it to the depositor's account fundamentally
involves a question of intention. (. . . 11 A.L.R.
8
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''
I

1043, s. 16 A.L.R. 1084, 42 A.L.R. 492, 68 A.L.R.
725, and 99 A.L.R. 486, 487 ; . · .. ) Where there. is
direct evidence of such intention, as where the contract expressly provides as to the passing of title,
the question is relatively simple.... Such intention
must, however, be determined as of the date when
the deposit is made, and not in the light of subsequent events. (11 A.L.R. 1046, s. 16 A.L.R. 1084,
42 A.L.R. 494, 68 A.L.R. 727, and 99 A.L.R. 488;
7 L.R.A. 852 ; . . . ) "
The intention of the parties at the time of the transfer of the instrument from the payee to his bank must
be determined by the written instruments admitted to
evidence under stipulation since no contrary evidence of
intention has been submitted to the Court.
Under the specific written agreements admitted to
evidence in this case and in view of the fact that there is
no evidence of any contrary intention, whether oral or
written, The Moffat County State Bank's relationship
to the payee of the check is conclusively proven to be
that of agent and under the prevailing law of the United
States and the State of Utah said bank does not qualify
as a holder in due course.

PoiNT

II.

II. THE LAW OF THE STATE OF UTAH MUST
BE APPLIED IN DETERMINING THE LEGAL
STATUS OF THE PLAINTIFF.
The plaintiff cites in defense of his position the Colorado case of Broomfield v. Cochran et al., 283 P. 45, but
the law of the State of Colorado is not applicable to the
9
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case at hand. In the present case the decisions relative
to the determination of this question of conflicts of law
have been summarized in 27 Yale Law Journal, Pages
804 through 807 as follows:
''The question of what law defines the defenses available against the good faith holder has
most frequently arisen where the defenses have
been asserted by the primary parties. . . . The
law of the place of endorsement when it differs
from that of both the place of execution and payment will not be held applicable. Nor does the
law of the place of exceution of the instrument
govern when the place of execution differs from
the place of payment and indorsement. But where
it is possible to isolate the place of payment from
both the place of execution and indorsement the
courts almost uniformly hold the law of the place
of payment to govern.... The weight of authority
seems to apply the same rule {to determine whether a holder is a holder in due course) as in the
case of defenses.''
The check was executed, delivered, and made payable in the State of Utah. It was drawn on a Utah bank
by a Utah resident and the action has been brought in a
Utah Court. The question as to whether the plaintiff is
a holder in due course, and entitled to maintain an action
against defendant as drawer of the check must be determined by the laws of the State of Utah.
"10 C.J.S. Bills and Notes § 47 (a) (1) at
page 486. - All rna tters bearing on the execution,
the interpretation, and validity, including the capacity of the parties to contract, are to be determined by the law of the place where the contract
is made. ( 2) All rna tters connected with the payment, including presentation, notice, demand, pro10
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test, and other damages for non-payment, are to be
regulated by the law of the place where the instrument is to be paid. All matters respecting the remedy to be pursued, including the bringing of suits,
service of process, and admissibility of evidence,
depend on the law of the place where the action is
brought.''
Under all of these categories, the law of Utah would
be applicable. While it is true that the indorsement by
Mr. Arnn to the plaintiff bank constituted a separate contract it must be remembered that this is not an action by
the receiving bank against the indorser but is one between the indorsee and the drawer, and the liability of
the drawer is to be determined by the law of the place
where the check is drawn and payable.
"10 C. J. S. Bills an.d Notes§ 61(b) at page
495. As the drawer of a bill of exchange does not
contract to pay the money in the foreign place on
which it is drawn, but only guarantees its acceptance and payment in that place by the drawee,
his contract is regarded as made at the place
where the bill is drawn, and as to its form and nature and the obligation and effect thereof is governed by the law of that place with regard to the
payee and any subsequent holder. This law governs the drawer's liability to an indorsee, determines his right to set up defenses against the
indorsee ... and determines the measure of his liability for interest and and damages.'' To the
same effect see 11 American Jurisprudence, Conflict of Laws§ 151.
''Ogden, Negotiable Instruments (5th Ed.
1947) § 256 at page 482 ... If a negotiable note is
made in one state and payable there, and it is
afterwards indorsed in another state, and by the

11
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law of the former state, equitable defenses are let
in, in favor of the maker, and by the laws of the
latter state excluded, the rule governing as to the
holder is the law of the place where the note. was
made. There the maker undertook to pay and the
· ··subsequent negotiation did not change his obligation or right. The contract of the drawer of a bill
of exchange. is governed by the law of the place
where the bill is drawn in regard to the rights of
the payee and any subsequent holder ... ''
''Ibid ~ 258 at pages 484 and 485. The liability of the indorser is said to be governed by the
law of the place where the indorsement is made.
... It is the new liability created by the indorsement in favor of the indorsee and subsequent
indorsers that causes this law to govern. This
law governs only as to the new liability created between the indorsee or subsequeut indorsers and the
prior indorsers. The right of the transferee or
indorsee against the original parties to the instrument a.re determined by the law of the place where
the contract was made or is to be performed . ... "
"Wharton, Conflict of Laws (3rd Ed. 1905)
§ 45 1 (c). While, as shown in a previous section,
the indorsement of a note or bill constitutes a separate and distinct contract, which, so far as concerns the liability of the indorser to subsequent
parties, is governed by the law of the place of
indorsement, it is established, practically without
contradiction, that the liability of, and substantive defenses available to, the maker of a ·note or
acceptor of a bill of exchange are, even as against
a subsequent indorsee, to be determined by the
law that originally governed the contract, and
cannot be increased, diminished, or impaired by
the subsequent indorsement or transfer. . .. ''

12
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I~

In Badger Machinery Co. v. United States Bank and
Trust Co., 166 Wise. 18, 163 N.W. 188 (1917) an action
was brought to, inter alia, enforce unpaid stock subscriptions and test the validity of outstanding bonds. Under
the law of Wisconsin the appellant was not a bona fide
holder in due course as the bonds were taken by it as
collateral security for a pre-existing debt. It was contended that the trial court erred in excluding proof
that under the New Mexico law, where the bonds were
transferred to appellant, the appellant was a holder in
due course. The Supreme Court in denying this contention stated:
''In the instant case the bonds were Wisconsin contracts payable in Wisconsin; the maker of
them ... is a Wisconsin corporation; and the appellant the United States Bank and Trust Co., is
enforcing its claim in a Wisconsin Court. True,
the contract between Bridge, who sold the bonds to
appellant, and appellant may be considered as
made outside of Wisconsin, and if the action here
were between appellant and Bridge, a different
question would be presented. The issues involved
in the case at bar are between the maker of the
paper involved and the appellant who purchased
the paper amd claims to be a holder for value in
due course.

"The laws of Wisconsin beca.me a part of the
contract of the maker in the instant case and determine whether the holder is a bon.a fide holder
for value in due course or not ...
''While there seems to be some conflict in the
authorities we are satisfied that the rule laid down
for the instant case is supported by the weight
of authority."
13
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In Woodruff v. Hill, 116 Mass. 310 at page 311 (1874)
the plaintiffs, as indorsees of a promissory note made in
Massachusetts by a Massachusetts resident and payable
there, brought suit in Massachusetts against the makers.
The note was indorsed by the payee to the plaintiffs in
New York. The defendants offered to prove that by the
law of New York the plaintiffs, upon the evidence, were
not bona fide holders for value except as to the amount
of the money paid by them to the payees at the time of
the indorsement. The Court upheld the exclusion of
such proof and stated:
''The note was made in Massachusetts and the
contract of the makers with the payees and with
any indorsee was to be performed here, and governed by our law. Story Conflict of Laws ~~ 317,
344, 356.''
The same result was reached in Webster v. Howe
Machine Co., 54 Conn. 394, 8 Atlantic 482 (1886) at page
483 where drafts were drawn in New York by one Stockwell on defendant company in favor of plaintiffs, who
were London bankers. The draft was delivered by Stockwell to plaintiffs who indorsed it and sold it for him, and
placed the proceeds to his credit in his account ·wi.th them,
as he was then indebted to them for a larger sum. Under
the law of New York, one who took a paper upon a preexisting debt was not a bona fide holder for value. The
Connecticut Supreme Court in holding that the law of
New York governed stated:
''The defendant had its office and place of
business in New York; there the acceptance was
made; there the bill was made payable. In an
14
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action at law for an enforcement of a contract, the
law of the jurisdiction in which it is made and to
be executed determines the extent of the obligation
of the contractor, and the character of the defenses
which he may interpose for his protection.''
In Bright v. Judson, 47 Barbour's Rep. 29, at page
36 (N. Y. 1866) it was held that a bill of exchange payable in New York, although delivered and accepted in the
State of Indiana, was a contract to be performed in New
York and was to be governed by the laws of that state as
to whether one who received a bill for an antecedent debt
is a bona fide holder for value.
''The defendant as acceptor of the draft in
suit, was the principal debtor, and although he
accepted in the State of Indiana, yet it was a contract to be performed in New York, and is to be
governed by the laws of that state.''
In First Natl. Ba.nk of Chicago v. Dean, 17 N.Y.S.
375 at page 378 (N.Y. 1892) it was held that the question
of whether the plaintiff was holder in due course of negotiable warehouse receipts was to be determined by the
law of New York where the contract was made and to be
performed and not by the law of Illinois where the notes
were indorsed to plaintiffs.
'' . . . It cannot be that if a negotiable obligation, made in this state, is there transferred for a
precedent debt, the transferee is not a bona fide
holder to shut out equities in favor of the maker;
and yet if the obligation is transferred in Illinois,
to a resident of that state, our courts must ignore
the rule adopted in this state and follow that prevailing in lllinois .... Any such doctrine would be
an unjust discrimination in favor of non-residents

15
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against residents of our own state, .inconsistent
with every principle of comity or notion of uniform
justice a.nd cannot prevail.
·
"As against (indorser), its obligation might,
in a proper action, be determined by the laws of
Illinois, because its indorsement - which is to an
extent an independent contract - was made and
delivered there .... ''
See also Pratt v. Dittmer, 197 P. 356 (Cal. App., 1921)
held that promissory notes payable in Iowa are to be
interpreted under the law of that state as to rights of
bona fide holder.

Green v. Kennedy, 6 Mo. App. 577 (Mo. 1879) held
that the question of a bona fide .holder was to be deter~
mined under the laws of the state where the note was
payable though negotiated in another state. See also
Tyrell v. Cairo a,nd S. L. R. R. Co., 7 Mo. App. 294 (1879).
Limerick Natl. Bank v. Howard, 51 Atl. 641 at page
643 (N.H. 1901) held that the law of Vermont where the
notes were executed and payable governs question as to
whether a party is a holder in due course.
''So, if by the law of the place of contract,
even although negotiable, equitable defenses are
allowed in favor of the baker, any subsequent
indorsement will not change his right in regard
to the holder. The latter must take it cum
onere ... "

United States v. Schaeffer, 33 F. Sup. 547 (D. C. Md.
1940). The question of whether the government was
holder in due course of a note was to be determined by
the laws of Maryland where the note was executed and
where the contract was made and to be performed.
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1·

I,

I:

"Allen v. Bratton, 47 Miss. 119 at page 128
(1872). As the notes were executed and to be paid
in Tennessee, they are to be governed by the laws
of that state, and upon questions connected with
commercial paper, it is there well settled that the
suspension or satisfaction of a precedent debt is
not sufficient consideration to give the assignee or
indorsee of a bill or note the position of a bona
:fide purchaser. . . . '' See also Harrison v. Pike
Bros., 48 Miss. 46 (1873).
One of the very basic policies of the conflict of laws
is to protect the justified expectations of parties by the
application of rules which will bring about uniform results
whenever and wherever a dispute arises. This can only be
accomplished in situations such as the present case by
applying the law of the place of payment when the suit
is between the alleged holder in due course and the maker
of the instrument. See Buschmann, Some Conflict of
Law's Problems Pertaining to Bills a;nd Notes, 8 Ind. L. J.
213, 227 and 228 (1933).
''. . . In the interest of uniformity in the
application of law, it is desirable, of course, to have
the law of the place of payment of the primary
party govern. This could be accomplished on the
theory that such. party expects to be governed,
as to defenses and negotiability, by the law of the
place of payment, and he is presumed to know what
constitutes a holder in due course under that
law. . . . "
The validity of this argument can be illustrated by
the following hypothetical case :
A writes two checks and delivers them in Utah to B.
B indorses and deposits one in C bank in state D. He
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indorses and deposits the other in E bank in State F.
By the law of State D, the bank has become a holder in
due course, by the law of State F it has not. Both banks
bring an action in Utah against A.
If the Utah court should apply the rule relied on by
the plaintiff, it would be faced with anomalous situation of
allowing recovery to Bank C and denying it to Bank E.
Yet, both cases ;;trose from the same transaction, and
present identical factual situations.
It would appear under the prevailing rules of conflict of law and logic that the laws of the State of Utah
must be applied in determining the rights of a holder
against the drawer of the instrument when the instrument
was prepared, executed and payable in the State of Utah.

PoiNT III.
III. THE CHECK WAS NOT PROTESTED AS
REQUIRED BY TITLE 44, CHAPTER 2, SECTION 27,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) AND THEREFORE THE DRAWER IS DISCHARGED.
Title 44, Chapter 2, Section 27, Utah Code Annotated
(1953), states as follows:
'' 44-2-27. IN wHAT CASES PROTEST NECESSARY.
-Where a foreign bill appearing on its face to be
such is dishonored by nonacceptance, it must be
duly protested for nonacceptance, and where such
a bill which has not previously been dishonored by
nonacceptance is dishonored by nonpayment, it
must be duly protested for nonpayment. If it is
not so protested, the drawer and indorsers are dis-
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charged. Where a bill does not appear on its face
to be a foreign bill, protest thereof in case of dishonor is unnecessary.''
The negotiable instrument, a copy of which is admitted to evidence in this case, and the stipulation of facts
indicate that the instrument was returned to The Moffat
County State Bank with the notation "refer to maker."
The check itself (R-3) contains the notation "not good
when presented. Not good now 10/24/56. '' It has been
stipulated that the plaintiff actually countermanded payment, but this fact was not known to the plaintiff bank
and the stop payment was not filed with the drawee bank
until after return of the instrument to plaintiff and
respondent (R-6) and therefore it was under the duty to
protest the instrument.
A formal countermand of the order of payment was
not executed until after the check was returned marked
"refer to maker." (R-6)
The law applicable in this case is set forth in 8 American Jurisprudence Bills and Notes Paragraph 697
as follows:
"8 Am. Jur. Bills and Notes, Par. 697 ... The
Uniform Act provides that where any negotiable
instrument has been dishonored it may be protested for non-acceptance or non-payment as the
case may be, but protest is not required except in
the case of foreign bills of exchange. The Act further provides that where a foreign bill appearing
on its face to be such is dishonored by non-acceptance, it must be duly protested for non-acceptance,
and where such a bill has not previously been dishonored by non-acceptance is dishonored by non-
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payment, it must be duly protested for non-payment. If it is not so protested, the drawer and
,endorsers are discharged ... it would seem, how~
ever, that a check which is not drawn and payable
within a State would be regarded as a foreign bill
of exchange within the meaning of the Uniform
Act and would require· protest.''
The plaintiff and respondent, The Moffat County
State Bank, is in effect placed on the horns of a dilemma
for if it contends that the check is an inland bill then no
question of conflict of laws arise and the law of the State
of Utah would apply and the said bank would not obtain
the benefit of being a holder in due course. On the other
hand if the plaintiff contends that the instrument is a
foreign bill then it has failed to protest the bill as required
by the above cited statute and again the drawer of the
instrument is discharged. The dilemma is in fact solved
for by a proper application of the rules of conflict of law,
the laws of the State of Utah must be applied and in all
events the drawer of th~ instrument is discharged.

CONCLUSION
The plaintiff and respondent must qualify as a holder
in due course in order to obtain judgment against the defendant and appellant. Under the law of the State of
Utah the plaintiff and respondent has not so qualified.
The law of the State of Utah is in accord with the major~
ity view in the United States.
The Moffat County State Bank claims that the law of
the State of Colorado applies and relies almost exchi;.
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sjvely on the case of Broomfield v. Cochran, supra, but
such case is not applicable under accepted conflicts of law
theories for the instrument in question was drawn and
payable in the State of Utah.
The plaintiff and respondent can take little comfort
from the Broomfield case since it is distinguished
by the in~roduction into evidence in the case at hand
of the depositor's agreement. This agreement was
executed by Mr. Arnn at the time of opening the account
and accepted by the bank by the acceptance of the account
and specifically and formally designated The Moffat
County State Bank as agent of the depositor for the purpose of collecting items referred to it. Under the equal
dignities rule any change in this agreement would have
to be subscribed by the parties and in writing. No evidence, oral or otherwise of a change in the agreement
has been adduced.
The intention of the parties at the time the check was
delivered by the payee to the receiving bank controls and
this intention is set forth in two written instruments.
The plaintiff's proper recourse is against the depositor
for monies paid.
Since it is apparent that The Moffat County State
Bank does not qualify as a holder in due course under the
law of the State of Utah or the terms of its written agreements and even if it did qualify it has not protested the
instrument as required by law, it is submitted that the
defendant and appellant is discharged from obligation on
the instrument ana the order granting plaintiff's motion
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for summary judgment was in error and should be set
aside and judgment entered for the defendant "no cause
of action.' '
Respectfully submitted,

IRVING H. BIELE
Attorn.ey for Defendant
and .Appellant

Receipt of copies of the above and foregoing Brief
of the Defendant and Appellant acknowledged this
----------------day of February, 1960.

VICTOR A. SPENCER
.Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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